The rising level of long-term care (LTC) expenditures and their financing sources are likely to impact savings and capital accumulation and henceforth the pattern of growth. This paper studies how the joint interaction of the family, the market and the State influences capital accumulation in a society in which the assistance the children give to dependent parents is triggered by a family norm. We find that, with a family norm in place, the dynamics of capital accumulation differ from the ones of a standard Diamond (1965) model with dependence. For instance, if the family help is sizeably more productive than the other LTC financing sources, a pay-as-you-go social insurance might be a complement to private insurance and foster capital accumulation. * The authors acknowledge financial support from the Chaire "Marché des risques et creation de valeur" of the FdR/SCOR. †
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the joint impact that alternative ways of financing long-term care (LTC) may have on capital accumulation.
LTC consists of nursing care (as opposed to health care) for people who depend on help to carry out daily activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, going to bed, getting up or using the toilet. 1 The demand for LTC is expected to increase. More than two out of five people aged 65 or older report having some type of functional limitation (sensory, physical, mental, self-care disability, or difficulty leaving home). In the EU, the relative importance of people aged 65+ will more than double by 2050, while the relative importance of people aged 80+ will more than triple. 2 Not only the relative number of dependent elderly will increase but also the costs because of the growing prices of services (the so-called Baumol disease).
On the supply side, the main provider of LTC is the family. Yet, in particular in a context of weakening family ties, individuals may also rely on the market of private insurance and on social policy. Even though the role of the family dominates that of the State and of the market, the relative importance of these three sources of provision varies across countries and over time.
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The present paper acknowledges both the importance of LTC and the diversity of its financing sources. 4 It uses a two period OLG model with risk of dependence to assess the influence of the various ways of financing LTC on capital accumulation. A casual look at the problem may lead one to think that the effect of LTC is not going to be different from the effect of any other type of increasing needs in old age, namely a call for more saving. In that respect LTC is expected to stimulate capital accumulation. This reasoning is surely correct 1 For a recent survey on the economics of LTC, see Cremer et al. (2012) or Siciliani (2013).
2 Source: European Commission (2013a). 3 For more details, see European Commission (2013b). 4 Brown and Finkelstein (2011) provide an overview of the economic and policy issues surrounding insuring LTC expenditure risk. They also discuss the likely impact of recent LTC public policy initiatives.
as long as LTC is financed by saving or private insurance. It is incorrect if LTC services are provided by the State or the family. Intuitively, as long as social insurance and family solidarity operate according to a pay-as-you-go principle, each of these two financing sources depresses capital accumulation. We show that, when different sources of LTC financing coexist, crowding out may lead to surprising results. The most interesting one is that, if family help is taken into account, a pay-as-you-go social LTC insurance may be a complement to private insurance and foster capital accumulation.
Our model rests on three key assumptions. First, we assume that the main motive for children's assistance is a family norm. 5 This idea is pervasive in sociology and gerontology.
As an example, Lowenstein and Daatland (2006) study the impact of filial norms on the exchange of intergenerational support between adult children and older parents across five
European countries. The effect of filial norms on help provision by children is shown to be moderate but significant and variable across countries, appearing more prescriptive in the South than in the North. Second, we focus on a particular type of assistance, consisting of an investment that children make before knowing whether their parents are dependent or not. This ex ante investment can concern housing or children's location and occupation choices. It is made with the idea that it will be particularly useful in the case parents become dependent. As an example, children may build a house with facilities that are relevant for dependent people.
The third key assumption is that parents prefer their children's help over other sources of LTC at least to a certain level. The idea that parents prefer being taken care by their children than by unknown formal caregivers (see Pauly 1990) 7 is standard and sometimes used to explain why parents avoid purchasing private insurance. 8 In this paper, the dependent parents value particularly the effort and time that children put in earning the resources that they devote to filial help. For the early stages of dependence, this assumption seems to be particularly compelling. In more severe cases, such as heavy dementia, the role of children might be less valuable for the dependent parents.
Our analysis will focus not only on the steady state but also on the dynamics along the equilibrium path. In our analysis, the role of the State is restricted to provide a social insurance without aiming at social optimality. Its role is thus quite passive, and our approach mainly positive. We first present what we call the benchmark model, that is, a model à la
Diamond without family help but with the possibility for the individuals to purchase private LTC insurance. In such a setting a pay-as-you-go social insurance scheme has a consistently depressive effect on capital accumulation. Also, there is no switch in the insurance behavior along the equilibrium path: individuals either always insure, or they never insure.
These two features do not hold any more when we introduce the family norm. The pay- at all, or the other way around. Finally, we show that the strength of the family norm on assistance has a depressive effect on capital accumulation, and that the probability of dependence affects capital accumulation in a non-monotonic way.
Economists have hardly treated the relationship between long-term care expenditures and capital accumulation. 9 The closest works are the ones on the effect of health care and of social security on growth. The literature on health investment, longevity and growth, is extensive, but has a different emphasis. 10 The literature on social security and growth finds that unfunded pension schemes have a depressive effect on capital accumulation relative to fully funded pensions or standard saving. The results of this literature are different from ours in that it always finds that old age family arrangements have the same effect as payas-you-go pensions except that they imply much larger incentive effects on either fertility or longevity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model.
In Section 3, we study the benchmark case without family norm. We allow for a family norm in Section 4, and we study how the parameters of the economy affect the dynamics and the steady state of capital accumulation. We conclude in Section 5. We present proofs and analytic developments in several technical appendices.
The economy
We consider an overlapping generations model where time is assumed to be discrete. All agents (individuals and firms) are price-takers, and all markets are competitive. Individuals live two periods and, without loss of generality, the size of the population is assumed to be
constant. An individual born in t supplies one unit of labor in the first period and receives the market wage w t . In the second period he is retired and is dependent with probability p ∈ (0, 1). In this case, he needs LTC.
The financing of LTC needs.
LTC needs can be financed through different channels: the market, the State and the family.
The market. Individuals can use the market to provide for their LTC needs. First of all, they can self-insure through precautionary savings. By saving s t in their young age they receive R t+1 s t in their old age, where R t+1 is the interest factor. Note that this way of financing LTC is not efficient, since ex-post savings are too high if the individual is not dependent. Alternatively, individuals can purchase an amount i t ≥ 0 of private LTC insurance in the first period. Then, they get an insurance allowance R t+1 i t /p in case of dependence in the second period. We thus assume that the insurance contract is actuarially fair. 11 In the following, we will say that individuals insure whenever they purchase private LTC insurance. Of course, even if they do not insure, they might (partially) self-insure through precautionary savings.
The State. The government may provide social LTC insurance through a pay-as-you-go system, by setting a linear tax τ ∈ [0, 1) on the labor income of the young in order to finance a transfer to the dependent. Then, each dependent elderly born in t receives a transfer τ w t+1 /p. We thus assume no loading factor in social LTC insurance.
The family. The family can provide help to the dependent. In each period t, young individuals devote a fraction x t ∈ [0, 1 − τ ] of their income to their parent. 12 This fraction is chosen before children know whether or not their parents are dependent.
The fraction of income devoted to parents depends on the past filial help behavior. Each individual observes the fraction Z t−1 = x t−1 + τ ∈ [0, 1) which his parent was willing to devote to his grandparent and the evolution 13 of Z t across time follows the process Z t =
, where π ∈ [0, 1] captures the intensity of transmission of the family norm.
Thus, Z t is increasing in Z t−1 , and it is equal to 0 if the family norm is not transmitted (i.e. π = 0), and equal to Z t−1 if the norm is perfectly transmitted (i.e. π = 1). In words, π can be viewed as the intensity of intergenerational imitation (or of transmission of the family norm). Since Z t = x t + τ , the evolution of the voluntary help x t follows a linear process:
This (linear) reduced form is consistent with the "demonstration effect" developed by Cox and Stark (2005) who state that parents who desire being helped in the future have an incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate preferences in their children.
14 They posit that the demonstration is not perfect by assuming that with probability ̟ a child will simply imitate his parent's action, while with probability 1 − ̟ he will choose an action to maximize his expected utility, aware though that his own child may be an imitator. Applying this approach to our dynamic settings leads to obtain a linear process for the evolution of family help.
Another feature of our specification is that the parents weight the help they receive from their children more than any other transfers (from savings, private and/or social insurance).
Indeed, an individual does not merely value his child's help as x t+1 w t+1 , but as x σ t+1 w t+1
with σ ∈ (0, 1) measuring the importance of filial help for the parent. The lower σ, the higher the evaluation of x t+1 is (with respect to the other sources of income) for the parent.
This captures the fact that, at least in the early stage of dependency 15 , the elderly prefer being taken care by relatives rather than by unknown caregivers (see Pauly, 1990 ). Since an increase in children's help is less valuable if the help is already high, our formulation also takes into account the fact that the parent gets a psychological benefit from filial help, but might feel guilty to receive too much of it. In the limit, if the children devote all their income 14 For an application of this method to a model of LTC financing without capital accumulation, see Canta and Pestieau (2013). 15 There exist several stages of dependence that can be characterized by the dependent elderly's ability to perform in different areas of cognition and functioning: orientation, memory, judgment, home and hobbies, personal care, and community.
to their parents (i.e. x t+1 = 1), the latter do not get any psychological gain from filial help, and evaluate x t+1 w t+1 as a mere monetary transfer.
Since our goal is to analyze the role of family help in presence of (potential) LTC needs, the family help is here most valuable for the parents in case of dependence. However, this help is not necessarily sunk: if the parent does not turn out to be dependent, he weights the family help by a parameter γ < 1.
The production process.
In any period t a single good is produced using two factors, capital K t and labor L t . Production occurs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology AK
with A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
Equilibrium Prices. As markets are perfectly competitive, each factor is paid its marginal product. Assuming that capital fully depreciates after one period we obtain:
where k t = K t /L t is the capital stock per worker in period t.
Inter-temporal equilibrium. As the endowment of capital at each period is equal to the resources that were not consumed in the preceding period, the capital stock in period t + 1 is financed by precautionary saving s t and private LTC insurance i t . Since the size of the population is constant, we have:
In words capital accumulation depends on optimal individual decisions.
The optimal individual behavior.
In order to understand individual behavior, we first define individual welfare. We then solve the individual optimization program, and study insurance decisions.
Individual welfare. In the first period, each young individual devotes a fraction x t of his wage w t to his elderly parent, and a fraction τ to the government. 16 He devotes his remaining income to consumption c t , precautionary savings s t , and private LTC insurance i t . In the second period, he consumes R t+1 s t , receives the help from his child and, in case of dependence, receives also the benefits of both the private and the social LTC insurance, respectively R t+1 i t /p and τ w t+1 /p.
The welfare W t of an individual born in t is:
with β ∈ (0, 1) is the psychological inter-temporal discount factor and
The function H(.) corresponds to second-period utility and is given by
if the individual is not dependent and otherwise by
The function H(.) takes into account the fact that the individual does not attribute the same value to the voluntary transfer received from his child as to other means of financing
captures the fact that dependent individuals have higher needs. 17 The parameter D > 0 measures the utility loss implied by dependence and 16 We thus implicitly assume that child's help is subject to payroll taxation exactly like precautionary saving and private LTC insurance. The alternative implying c t = (1 − τ )(1 − x t )w t − s t − i t would not have conducted to much different results. 17 The assumption that is assumed to be high enough to ensure that H dep (κ) < H not dep (κ) for any feasible value of κ.
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Finally, for the sake of tractability, the instantaneous utility function u(.) is assumed to be logarithmic.
The optimization problem. From now on, we use the indicator function 1l ≡ 1l π>τ ≥0
to encompass the benchmark case without family help where 1l = 0 (i.e. π = τ = 0 and π = 0 < τ < 1) and the case with family help where 1l = 1 (i.e. π > τ ≥ 0). 19 Then, using
(1) an individual born in t solves the following problem:
under the non-negative constraints s t ≥ 0 and i t ≥ 0.
To avoid unrealistic corner solutions in which individuals do not self-insure through precautionary savings (and then rely exclusively on family help if they are not dependent), we will make the following assumption:
As it is shown in Appendix A, Assumption 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) to have a positive s t . Intuitively the weight γ of the family help is perceived by the parent as being low and incite him to self-insure through precautionary savings.
Hence, the first order condition (FOC) with respect to s t is:
18 Since we always obtain bounded steady states solutions, the resources of the economy are always finite and consumption is bounded by a threshold κ max . Since
, it is sufficient to assume that D is such that κ max < κ.
Remark that without transfers from external sources (i.e. τ = π = 0), this FOC would not depend on R t+1 .
Insurance behavior. The unconstrained solution for i t could be negative, leading to a corner solution. Conversely, when individuals insure the FOC with respect to i t is:
Then, we formally obtain the following optimal level for insurance (see Appendix A.1):
Depending on the values of τ , p, ξ, γ, σ, π and x t , ε(x t ) can take any values in [0, +∞)
while δξ can take any values in (0, +∞). This will lead to different dynamics of capital accumulation depending on the relative importance of sources of LTC financing.
Benchmark case: absence of family help
In order to understand the role of the family, we will first study an economy where the family help is not operative, i.e. individuals cannot directly help their elderly parents. We will denote this case with the subscript d, since it corresponds to the model of Diamond (1965) adapted to allow for dependence.
The market.
First, consider the case where the government does not intervene, i.e. τ = 0. Then, there are no intergenerational transfers, ε(x t ) = 0, and individuals only provide for dependence in old age through precautionary savings or private LTC insurance. According to (6) , individuals insure and this decision is independent of the capital stock. Based on equations (2) to (6), the dynamics of capital accumulation are given by (see Appendix B.1):
Intuitively, individuals always transfer a share A −1 ζ p /(1 − α) of their wage w t to the second period using precautionary savings and private LTC insurance. According to (7), there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock,
According to equations (2) to (6), the dynamics of capital accumulation can be described by (see Appendix B.1):
with:
Since the sign of pδξ − τ is time-independent, no switch in the insurance behavior is possible: individuals choose either to insure or not to insure in all periods. We can thus identify two regimes, characterized by the presence (or absence) of private LTC insurance along the optimal path {k t } t≥0 . The existence of these two different dynamics is due to the presence of the social LTC insurance. As we have shown above, the insurance behavior does not affect capital accumulation when the government does not intervene (i.e.
According to (8) , there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock,
which is globally stable in IR ⋆ + , i.e., for all k 0 ∈ IR ⋆ + , the optimal path {k t } t≥0 converges monotonically to k d .
Remark that the steady state is such that
, where the superscripts "n" and "i" denote "no insurance" and "insurance", respectively.
We can now look more closely at the effect of τ on capital accumulation (see Appendix B.3
and Figure 1) . 20 The capital stocks k Intuitively, as τ increases, individuals get more social LTC insurance, which discourages precautionary savings and private LTC insurance.
To conclude, our results are standard, and mirror Diamond's model with the only difference that we introduced dependence and LTC insurances. They can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 -Without family help, the capital stock k t converges monotonically to k d .
The steady state capital stock decreases as the tax rate increases. The insurance behavior is time invariant. If the tax rate τ and/or the probability 1 − p are sufficiently low (resp. high), individuals always insure (resp. never insure).
We will now study whether these results are robust to the introduction of the family.
4 The State, the market, and the family
We now consider the case where children can help their parents. As described previously, family help is triggered by a norm imposing that a certain fraction of children's earnings is devoted to the parents.
In the following we characterize first the dynamics of voluntary family help, then the dynamics of capital accumulation. Finally, we study the effect of the intensity of intergenerational imitation, the probability of dependence, and the tax rate on the steady state capital stock.
The dynamics of family help.
We here want to focus on the case where the family help is always operative. Henceforth we restrict our study as follows.
Assumption 2. τ < π and x 0 < 1 − τ .
Assumption 2 ensures that x t ∈ (0, 1 − τ ). 21 Then, the dynamics {x t } t≥0 of family help described by (1) and represented in Figure 2 converge monotonically to x = π − τ .
The dynamics of family help x t+1 = ψ(x t ).
Remark that the fraction x t+1 is linear in x t , and non-linear in π. Indeed, given
is a concave function of π, increasing up toπ t = (1 + x t + τ )/2 and decreasing afterwards.
Then, the parameter π ∈ (τ, 1] measures the intensity of imitation, but also its imperfection.
This allows the individuals to devote a bigger or a smaller share with respect to the past generation. If π ∈ (τ, x t + τ ), the imitation is weak and children transmit a smaller fraction than their parents did (i.e., x t+1 < x t ). If π ∈ (x t + τ, 1), the imitation is strong and children transmit a bigger fraction than their parents did (i.e., x t+1 > x t ). Finally, in the limit case where π = 1, imitation is perfect, and x t+1 = x t .
The global dynamics.
Insurance behavior. According to (6), individuals insure if and only if δξ > ε(x t ). Here, it is important to emphasize that ε(x t ) depends on x t and is then time-dependent. Thus, contrary to the benchmark case, changes in the insurance behavior over time are possible.
Assumption 1 ensures that ε(x t ) increases in x t . Then, ε(x t ) and δξ cannot cross more than in one point denoted byx. Consequently, individuals insure for any x t <x and do not insure for any x t >x. When δξ ≤ min {ε(x 0 ), ε(x)}, there is no insurance in any period (Regime I). When δξ > max {ε(x 0 ), ε(x)}, there is positive insurance in any period (Regime II). When ε(x) < δξ ≤ ε(x 0 ) the dynamics display a switch from no insurance to insurance along the equilibrium path (Regime III). Finally, when ε(x 0 ) < δξ ≤ ε(x), the dynamics displays a switch from no insurance to insurance (Regime IV).
The dynamics of capital accumulation. Importantly, the impact of the parameters of interest on the insurance behavior, described above, is independent qualitatively of the level of γ. Thus, without loss of generality but for the sake of tractability, we illustrate the dynamics of capital accumulation when γ = 0. In this case, ε(x t ) = τ /p + ψ σ (x t ) can be interpreted as the transfer that an individual in t + 1 receives in case of dependence from external sources (the State and his child). According to equations (2) to (6), these dynamics are given by (see Appendices A.2 and A.3):
Using ε(x) = τ /p + (π − τ ) σ and according to (9) , there exists a unique positive steady state capital stock,
Remark that the steady state capital stock is such that k = max k i , k n .
The dynamics of {k t } t≥0 are more complex with family help than in the benchmark case, because η(x t ) and µ(x t ) depend on x t .
The global dynamics. According to (1) and (9), the dynamic system (k t , x t ) is described by:
It is globally asymptotically stable and converges to a unique steady state: the pair ( k, x).
We can thus distinguish the four regimes characterized by the insurance behavior along the equilibrium path evoked in the beginning of this section (see Figure 3 ).
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Our main results established Appendix C can be summarized as follows: 22 In Figure 3 ,
No insurance Proposition 2 -The dynamic system (k t , x t ) is defined by (9) and (1). For all (k 0 , x 0 ) ∈ IR ⋆ + ×IR + , this system is globally asymptotically stable and converges to ( k, x). The dynamics of capital accumulation are not necessarily monotonic.
Individuals always (resp. never) insure if δξ is sufficiently high (resp. low). For intermediate values of δξ and x 0 < x (resp. x 0 > x), individuals insure (resp. do not insure) up to a certain period, and then decide not to insure (resp. insure). Thus, one (and unique) switch in the insurance behavior is possible.
Contrary to the benchmark case without family help, the dynamics of capital accumulation are not necessarily monotonic and might be characterized by switches in the insurance behavior. Intuitively, since the family help and the private LTC insurance are substitutes, the dynamics of family help affect the insurance behavior over time. If family help increases over time, individuals might reduce the purchase of private LTC insurance. After a certain period, the market for private LTC insurance completely disappears. To the contrary, if family help decreases over time, the market for private LTC insurance might emerge after a certain period.
Comparative statics.
We now study the impact of the parameters of the economy on insurance behavior and long run capital accumulation. It is worth noting that the impact the impact of the parameters of interest on the insurance behavior, described above, is independent qualitatively of the level of γ. Thus, without loss of generality and for the sake of tractability, we follow the Section 4.2 by illustrating the comparative statics on capital accumulation when γ = 0.
Intensity of intergenerational imitation. We now study the impact of π, the intensity of imitation, on capital accumulation (see Appendix D.2 and Figure 4) . As π increases from τ to 1, ε(x) increases from τ /p to τ /p + (1 − τ ) σ . Then, the steady state capital stock k is k i (and individuals insure) whenever π < π a = τ + max{0, min{(δξ − τ /p) Intuitively, if π increases, the fraction of income x devoted to elderly parents increases.
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On the one hand, this reduces the disposable income in young age. On the other hand, this also increases the transfer that individuals expect from their children. These two effects lead to a reduction in precautionary saving and private LTC insurance and, consequently, in the capital stock.
Probability of dependence. The impact of p on capital accumulation is somehow more complex (see Appendix D.3). It depends on whether the government intervenes or not in providing social LTC insurance. When the government does not intervene, ε(x) = π σ does not depend on p and two cases can be identified depending on the intensity of intergenerational imitation. When π is sufficiently high (i.e., δξ ≤ π σ ) the family help is so high that individuals decide not to insure. Note also that the steady state capital stock k n | τ =0 decreases when p increases (see Figure 5A ). Intuitively, as the probability of dependence increases, it becomes less interesting to transfer consumption to the non-dependent state, while the LTC needs will be met by family help. When π is sufficiently low (i.e., δξ > π σ ), individuals decide to insure and the steady state capital stock k i | τ =0 is increasing in p (see Figure 5B) . Intuitively, the higher the probability of dependence, the more individuals insure for old age, so that the capital stock increases.
Consider now the case where τ > 0. As p increases from 0 to 1, the threshold ε(x)
decreases from +∞ to τ + (π − τ ) σ . Consequently, when δξ is sufficiently low (i.e., δξ ≤ τ + (π−τ ) σ ) individuals decide not to insure and the steady state capital stock k n decreases (resp: increases) when p is lower (resp: larger) than a threshold p ∈ (0, 1] defined Appendix D.3 (see Figure 6A) . Thus, we find that the relationship between the probability of dependence and capital accumulation can be non monotonic. Intuitively, when p is sufficiently low, individuals fully rely on the social LTC insurance and family help. As the probability of dependence increases, it becomes less interesting to transfer consumption to the nondependent state, while the government and the family help cover the dependent state. Thus, the capital stock k n decreases. Conversely, when the probability p is high, the return of social insurance, τ /p, is very low, and individuals increase their own savings, so that the capital stock k n increases. Figure 6 : The steady state capital stock k as a function of p when τ > 0.
When δξ is sufficiently high (i.e., δξ > τ + (π − τ ) σ ) individuals decide not to insure when
and insure when p > p a . As 0 < p < p a < 1, the steady state capital stock, k n , decreases when 0 < p < p and increases when p < p < p a . Finally, the steady state capital stock, k i , increases when p a < p < 1 (see Figure 6B) . Remark that the threshold p a increases in π: as the imitation becomes more intense, individuals insure for a smaller range of probabilities of dependence. This is a standard case of crowding out.
The social LTC insurance crowds out private LTC insurance, so that individuals insure only if τ is small enough. The size of τ also affects the impact of the probability of dependence on the insurance decision. To show this, let us compare the case where τ = 0 and τ > 0, limiting the analysis to the case where π is small enough (Figures 5B and 6B ): individuals always insure with no public intervention, while in presence of social LTC insurance, individuals insure as long as p > p a .
Tax rate. In order to inform policy makers about the optimal social LTC insurance, it is important to assess the impact of the tax rate on capital accumulation (see Appendix D.4).
We can distinguish two cases depending on the value of π, reminding that the derivative of ε(x) with respect to τ has the sign of τ − τ . As γ = 0, we have τ = π − (pσ) 1/(1−σ) .
When π ≤ (pσ) 1/(1−σ) , as τ increases from 0 to π, the threshold ε(x) decreases from π σ to π/p. Then, the steady state capital stock k is k i (and individuals insure) if τ > τ b , while it is k n (and individuals do not insure) when τ ≤ τ b with:
is the unique root of the function Λ(τ ) = δξ − ε(x). Furthermore, an increase in the tax rate has always a positive impact on the steady state capital stock (see Figure 7A ).
No ins. Ins.
A -π ≤ (pσ)
Ins.
B -π > (pσ) , π) are the roots of function Λ(τ ).
Since k i and k n , the steady state capital stock k is always decreasing up to τ and increasing afterwards. However, Figure 7B encompasses five parameters configurations in terms of insurance behaviors. In two configurations the steady state insurance regime does not change as τ varies. Indeed, individuals always (resp: never) insure when τ c = τ d = τ (resp: τ c = 0
and τ d = π). In two other configurations, as τ increases, only one change in the reference regime is possible. This is the case where
The comparative statics with respect to τ are surprising. In the absence of family help (see Figure 1) , the effect of the tax rate on the capital stock is negative. With family help, the intuition for Figure 7 is to be found in the relative costs and returns of the family norm and of social LTC schemes. On the one hand, at the steady state, x + τ = π. This implies that on the contribution side the two schemes are perfect substitutes. On the other hand, the return of the social LTC contribution τ w is constant and equal to 1/p , while the return of xw decreases with x. As a consequence, when τ is big, x is small and yields a return that can be higher than 1/p. Thus, an increase in τ causes a decrease in x, which in turn implies a decline in LTC expenditures. To compensate for such a decline the individuals increasingly turn to market sources of LTC financing, fostering capital accumulation. Of course, if π is relatively small x is also relatively small, and might have a higher return than 1/p for any level of τ . In this case, the steady state capital stock always increases if the tax rate increases. This intuition also explains our finding that social and private LTC insurance can be complements: for sufficiently high levels of the tax, private LTC insurance may emerge as the tax level increases. This message is counterintuitive but important: in presence of family support individuals choose private LTC insurance if the pay-as-you-go social LTC insurance is generous enough; and the more generous the latter, the higher the economic growth. Thus, the fact that an aging population leads the State to establish generous unfunded social LTC insurance may in some circumstances encourage individuals to ensure themselves privately and is therefore beneficial for growth.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered that LTC can be financed by four different channels: savings, private insurance, family help based on a norm, and an unfunded public scheme. Using a simple OLG model we have obtained a number of interesting results along the equilibrium path and on the stationary equilibrium.
In the benchmark case, namely without any family norm, the stock of capital evolves monotonically, either upward or downward. Individuals resort to private insurance when the loading factor is not too high. With the family norm, the evolution is not monotonic anymore. Finally there are plausible cases in which, along the equilibrium path, people switch their insurance behavior: they buy private insurance up to a certain period, then they stop doing it, or vice versa.
Turning to the steady states, we study the effects of three key parameters: the tax rate, the intensity of intergenerational imitation, and the probability of dependence. The relation between the payroll tax and the capital stock is expected to be negative. However, it may be positive when the family help is sizeably more productive that the other LTC financing sources. Since social insurance crowds out family help, individuals may compensate by increasing savings and private insurance. Not surprisingly, the intensity of intergenerational imitation has a depressive effect on capital accumulation. The probability of dependence has an effect on capital accumulation that depends on the prevalence of insurance. With private insurance, it is always positive; without private insurance, its sign is ambiguous. Private insurance arises for a range of intermediate values of p. The introduction of a family norm crowds out private insurance and reduces this range.
Even though our paper is basically positive, it has some interesting policy implications. In particular, it indicates that the intervention of the State in LTC financing may not discourage but foster capital accumulation through saving and private insurance purchase. This being said, we should be extremely cautions in deriving policy recommendations. The optimal allocation will depend on the social rate of discount but also on the resource allocation at each period of time. If family assistance is clearly more effective than private insurance, it might be desirable to have less capital accumulation and better LTC. Dealing with this normative issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is clearly on our research agenda.
In this paper we take the family norm as given without any normative judgment. We also assume identical individuals. If this were not the case and if people were to differ in the extent of the filial norm they are subject to, we would end up with an unfair situation in which only those with children willing and able to take care of them would receive the care they need. In that case, there would be an additional role for the public sector (see on this
Stuifbergen and Van Delden (2011)).
Appendices
Appendix A -Capital accumulation and insurance behavior.
An agent born in t chooses s t and i t to maximize W t under the constraints s t ≥ 0 and i t ≥ 0. After computations, the first order condition with respect to s t is given by (4), and, when i t > 0, the first order condition with respect to i t is equivalent to (5).
A.1 -Insurance behavior depending on δξ and ε(x t ).
Merging (4) and (5) to eliminate their first term leads to the following equation: i t /p = ξs t − ε(x t )w t+1 /R t+1 . As δw t+1 = k t+1 R t+1 and k t+1 = s t + i t , the equation can be rewritten
Then, agents purchase LTC insurance if and only if δξ > ε(x t ) and insurance behaviors are described by (6).
A.2 -Capital accumulation when i t = 0.
t when π = 0 and δξ ≤ ε(x t ),
A.3 -Capital accumulation when i t > 0.
. Using these equations, we obtain δ(1 + pξ){s
. Then, according to Appendix A.1,
B.3 -Comparative statics with respect to τ when π = 0. According to Appendices A.2 and A.3, we obtain the two dimensional dynamical system described by (1) and (9) . Then, the existence and the uniqueness of the positive steady state, denoted ( k, x), are straightforward.
C.1 -Dynamics of family help.
The dynamics of x t , described by (1) and represented Figure 2 , are straightforward and independent of k. Then, the locus x t+1 = x t expressed as a function of k is a vertical line with abscissa x in the plan (x, k). To the left of this line, x t+1 − x t > 0 and, for any k > 0, x t converges towards x. To the right of this line, x t+1 − x t < 0 and, for any k > 0, x t converges towards x.
C.2 -Local dynamics with no insurance.
Assume that from a date κ ≥ 0, agents do not insure. The locus k t+1 −k t = 0 as a function of x can be written as g(x) = η(x)
As η(x) is a decreasing and convex function of x, g(x) is also a decreasing and convex
Above the curve k t+1 − k t < 0, for any x ∈ (0, 1 − τ ), k t converges towards g(x). Then, using Appendix C.1, the dynamics in the neighborhood of ( k n , x) are described in Figure 3A .
C.3 -Local dynamics with insurance.
Assume that from a date κ ≥ 0, agents insure. The locus k t+1 − k t = 0 as a function of
x can be written as h(x) = µ(x) Since µ(x) is a decreasing and convex function of x, h(x), which represents k t+1 −k t = 0, is also a decreasing and convex function of x. The equation k t+1 = h(x) 1−α k α t can be rewritten as k t+1 − k t = [(h(x)/k t ) 1−α − 1]k t . Below the curve k t+1 = k t , for any x ∈ (0, 1 − τ ), k t converges towards h(x). Above the curve, for any x ∈ (0, 1 − τ ), k t converges towards h(x).
Then, using Appendix C.1, the dynamics in the neighborhood of ( k i , x) are described in Figure 3B .
C.4 -Global dynamics: the different regimes.
First, remark that µ(x t ) = η(x t ) if and only if δξ = ε(x t ). Then, since η(x t ) is decreasing in ξ while µ(x t ) increases in ξ, µ(x t ) η(x t ) if and only if δξ ε(x t ). Since ε(x) increases in x, g(x) and h(x) cannot cross in more than one point: the pointx such that ε(x) = δξ. Consequently, individuals insure for any x t <x and do not insure for any x t >x.
Since the dynamics of x t are monotonic (increasing if x 0 < x and decreasing if x 0 > x) and independent of k t , and using the fact that k t+1 = max{g(x t ) 1−α , h(x t ) 1−α }k α t , we can distinguish four types of dynamics. Regime I occurs when δξ ≤ min{ε(x 0 ), ε(x)}. As g(x) ≥ h(x), agents do not insure and, according to Appendix C.2, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3A . Regime II occurs when δξ > max{ε(x 0 ), ε(x)}. As h(x) > g(x), agents insure and, according to Appendix C.3, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3B . Regime III occurs when ε(x) < δξ ≤ ε(x 0 ). As long as t ≤ T = E [ln {π − τ −x/(π − τ − x 0 )} / ln(π − τ )] + 1,
x t >x decreases and agents do not insure because h(x) ≤ g(x). When t > T , x t <x, h(x) > g(x) and individuals insure. Then, according to Appendices C.1 and C.2, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3C . Regime IV occurs when ε(x 0 ) < δξ ≤ ε(x). As long as t < T ′ = E [ln {x − π + τ /(x 0 − π + τ )} / ln(π − τ )] + 1, x t <x increases and agents insure because h(x) > g(x). When t ≥ T ′ , x t >x, h(x) ≤ g(x) and agents do not insure. Then, according to Appendices C.1 and C.3, we obtain the dynamics of Figure 3D . It is straightforward that both ∂η(x)/∂τ and ∂µ(x)/∂τ have the opposite sign of ∂ε(x)/∂τ .
Consider the subcase where 0 < π < (pσ) 1/(1−σ) . As ∂ε(x)/∂τ < 0, k n = η(x) 24 Note that λ(p a ) = δ(1 + ξ)p a τ , which, together with λ ′ (p) > 0, implies that p a > p.
